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INDEMNIFICATION OF UNDERWRITERS AND SECTION 11
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AT common law there was no civil liability to purchasers of securities for
negligent misstatements or omissions in the prospectus accompanying the is-
sue.' The Securities Act of 1933, however, imposed a statutory duty of care
upon every person who signs the registration statement for the issue, the
directors of the issuer, the "experts" who prepare or certify portions of the
registration statement and the prospectus, and the underwriter of the issue.2
Civil liability is not confined to misstatements or omissions in information
which each party personally supplies; rather, each participant in the issue
must discharge the burden of proof that "he had, after reasonable investiga-
tion, reasonable ground to believe and did believe," that the entire registration
statement and prospectus contained no misstatement or omission.8 Though
there is no case law to demonstrate the point, it is clear that an underwriter
could be held liable for failing to discover a misstatement made by another
party to the securities issue.
Under Section 14 of the Securities Act, the underwriter is prohibited from
contracting with a securities purchaser for exemption from liability.4 But it
has become general practice for the original contract between the underwriter
and the issuer to contain a provision that each promises to indemnify the other
against any liabilities growing out of any act or omission on his part. In effect,
the underwriter vouches only for the information that he provides in the
registration statement and prospectus-the price at which the issue is to be of-
fered, the discounts to be allowed sub-underwriters or dealers, and the mode
of distribution. 6 And the underwriter is promised indemnity if he is held liable
to a purchaser concerning any information which he did not personally pro-
vide.T On its face this arrangement seems fair since each party is held respon-
sible only for his own active misdeeds. But the Securities Act does not impose
an absolute statutory liability; the underwriter will only be held liable if, after
reasonable investigation, he should have discovered the inaccuracy of the in-
1. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889) ; Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N.Y. 124, 41
N.E. 414 (1895). See Note, The Liability of Directors and Officers for Misrepresentation in
the Sale of Securities, 34 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1090, 1095-98 (1934).
2. Section 11 (a), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1958).
3. Section 11 (b) (3), 48 Stat. 82-83 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1958).
This duty is subject to qualifications concerning "expert" statements, Act of June 6, 1934,
§11(b) (3) (C), 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (C) (1958).
4. Section 14, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1958). "Any condition, stipulation
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any pro-
vision of this title... shall be void."
5. THOMAS, FEDERAL SECURTIES ACT HANDooic 114 (2d ed. 1960).
6. Lockwood & Anderson, Underwriting Contracts, within Purview of Securities Act of
1933; with Certain Suggested Provisions, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 33, 41 (1939).
7. PRAcTIcING LAw INSTITUTE, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 84 (Isracls & Duff
eds. 1962).
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formation in the registration statement or prospectus. The indemnity agree-
ment thus relieves the underwriter from the financial consequences of his
breach of statutory duty.
The Securities Act does not explicitly deal with indemnity agreements.
However, the Securities and Exchange Commission has indicated in Rule
460 that it regards indemnity agreements between the issuer and a "director,
officer, or controlling person" of the issuer to be contrary to the act.8 In
respect to such agreements, the Commission insists that the registration state-
ment contain a clause stating that "in the opinion of the Securities and Ex,:-
change Commission such indemnification is against public policy as expressed
in the Act" and stating that where a claim for indemnity is asserted (other
than for a successful legal defense) the issuer will litigate the validity of the
indemnity agreement in the courts.9 This rule applies to underwriting con-
tracts only where the underwriter is also a "director, officer, or controlling
person" of the issuer.' 0 Otherwise the Commission has expressed no objection
to the standard indemnification agreement between issuer and underwriter.'
In fact, its lack of concern for underwriter indemnity agreements, when viewed
in the light of their widespread use, suggests that the Commission does not
question the legality of these agreements.
Professor Loss, however, has raised three objections to indemnity agree-
ments which, if correct, would seem equally applicable both to agreements be-
tween the underwriter and the issuer and to those between directors and the
issuer.
8. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 Note (Supp. 1962):
The Commission ... may refuse to accelerate the effective date: (a) where ...
provision is made for indemnification by the registrant of a director, officer or con-
trolling person of the registrant against liabilities arising under the act, unless waiver
is obtained from such [indemnitee] ... or there is included in the registration state-
ment... an undertaking in substanitally [sic] the following form: ... the registrant
has been advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission such
indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the act and is, therefore, un-
enforceable. In the event that a claim for indemnification against such liabilities
(other than the payment by the registrant of expenses incurred... in the successful
defense of any action...) is asserted by such director, officer or controlling person
... the registrant vil... submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question
whether such indemnification by it is against public policy as expressed in the act ....
9. Ibid.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 Note (Supp. 1962):
The Commission ... may refuse to accelerate the effective date:
(b) Where the underwriting agreement . .. contains provisions by which in-
demnification against liabilities arising under the act are given by the registrant to
the underriter... and a director, officer or controlling person of the registrant is
such an underwriter... or member of any firm which is such an underwriter unless
a waiver or an undertaking of the character specified in paragraph (a) is included
in the registration statement.
11. The Chief Counsel of the Commission's Corporation Finance Division stated at a
Practicing Law Institute Forum that "it is usual practice to indemnify underwriters, and
the Commission is not concerned with the indemnification of underwriters as such." State-
ment by Charles H. Shreve, in PRATCING LAW Ixsrrrtrr, op. cit. supra note 7, at 147.
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He states that Section 11(f) 12 which permits contribution among those
liable under Section 11 reveals an implicit prohibition of such agreements:
"Indemnification defeats pro tanto the statutory provision on contribution."18
But this seems a strained reading of the provision. Arguably, since Section
11(f) permits contribution "as in cases of contract," the right to contribution
may be varied by agreement between the entitled parties,14 even to full in-
demnity, as in cases of contract at common law. 15 Since the clear purpose of
Section 11(f) was to supplant the common law rule precluding contribution
among joint tortfeasors, 16 it seems unjustified to read any expression of
legislative intention regarding indemnity agreements into Section 11(f).
Loss also suggests that an indemnity agreement might be regarded as a
waiver of compliance with the act contrary to Section 14;17 but Section 14
applies only to agreements "binding any person acquiring any security."",
Although the underwriter himself may properly be regarded as a purchaser
acquiring securities from the issuer, his only right under the act against the
issuer is for contribution 0 and that right remains intact. And of course the
indemnity agreement does not alter the liability of the underwriter to any
later purchaser.
Finally, Loss relies on a prophylactic policy which he regards as implicit
in the act, arguing that indemnification "is hostile to the in terrorem effect in-
tended for Section 11 ... to promote careful adherence to the statutory re-
quirements." 20 To assess the strength of this argument, we must first deter-
mine the content courts have given the notion of public policy in reviewing
agreements generally which relieve against the financial consequences of civil
liability.
In the leading case of New York Central RR v. Lockwood,21 which involved
an exculpation agreement, the Supreme Court held invalid a contract exempt-
ing a railroad from liability to a passenger for any negligent injury. The Court
relied on two grounds: exculpation would contradict the purpose of liability in
12. Section 11(f), 48 Stat. 83 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1958).
[E]very person who becomes liable to make any payment under this section may
recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately,
would have been liable to make the same payment ....
13. 3 Loss, SEcuRrrEs REGULATION 1831 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
14. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 178-79
(1933).
15. Tait v. Downey, 267 Mass. 422, 166 N.E. 857 (1929) ; Cambria Title Savings &
Trust Co. v. Barron, 293 Pa. 116, 141 Atl. 845 (1928) ; McManus v. Butler, 213 S.W. 447
(Mo. 1919) ; Batard v. Hawes, 2 El. & B. 287, 297, 118 Eng. Rep. 775, 778-79 (H.L. 1853)
(dictum).
16. 3 Loss 1737.
17. Id. at 1832.
18. Section 14, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1958). See text quoted note 4 supra.
19. Section 11(f), 48 Stat. 83 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § M7k(f) (1958). See text quoted
note 12 supra.
20. 3 Loss 1831.
21. 84U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
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"raising the most stringent motive for the exercise of carefulness,"' 2 and the
passenger, who was in a severely inferior bargaining position, would be unfair-
ly deprived of compensation for his injury.23
The first ground seems directly applicable to indemnity agreements; accept-
ing the premise that release from financial liability encourages breach of duty,
it could be argued that exculpatory agreements and indemnity agreements
would produce the same effect. But where indemnity agreements were sub-
sequently challenged under the Lock-wood doctrine, the courts refused to ac-
cept this objection to these agreements. 24 Rather such agreements, which
involved indemnification for statutory 2 5 as well as common law, 2 liability, were
upheld, apparently because they were not inconsistent with the second princi-
ple expressed in Lockwood: where the injured party was not deprived of
compensation, indemnification by a third party would not offend public pol-
icy 27
In these cases, where the liability was absolute or for conduct which fell
below commonly accepted standards of reasonable care, these courts concluded
that the threat of liability would probably not significantly affect the manner of
carrying on the activities involved, e.g., management of factories,28 railroadsi "
or construction firms.30 Moreover, all injured parties may be ex\'pected to sue
in vindication of their rights. Compensation would effectively undo the harm
caused by the negligent conduct; the deterrent value of the threat of liability is
too speculative to be determinant of these cases.
3 1
But Section 11 of the Securities Act imposed neither strict liability nor
liability for conduct which was generally considered to be unreasonable.
Rather, it imposed a novel obligation upon those liable, particularly insofar
as it required underwriters, accountants, and such experts as engineers and
appraisers to make a reasonable investigation into the truth of all informa-
tion contained in the registration statement and prospectus. The purpose for
this new duty is to secure disclosure to the public of as much reliable inforna-
22. Id. at 377-78.
23. Id. at 379-80.
24. Private indemnity agreements not involving insurance upheld: General Ace., Fire
& Life Assur. Corp. v. Smith & Oby Co., 272 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Sinclair Ref. Co.
v. Stevens, 123 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 804 (1942) ; Harnden v.
Southern Sur. Co., 200 Mo. App. 162, 204 S.W. 34 (1918). Insurance contracts upheld:
California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U.S. 387 (1890) ; Phoenix Ins. Co. -. Erie
& West. Trans. Co., 117 U.S. 312 (1886) ; Trenton Passenger Ry. v. Guarantors' Liab.
Indem. Co., 60 N.J.L. 246,37 Atl. 609 (1897). See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, at §§ 14-20 (1948).
25. E.g., Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739
(1923).
26. E.g., Kansas City, If. & B.R.L Co. v. Southern Ry. News Co., 151 Mo. 373, 52
S.W. 205 (1899).
27. See cases cited notes 24-26 supra &28-29 hinra.
28. E.g., Cozzi v. Owens Coming Fiber Glass Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 117, 164 A.2d 69
(Super. Ct App. Div. 1960).
29. E.g., Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 24 F.2d 347 (6th Cir.
1928).
30. E.g., Schwartz v. ,ferola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299 (1943).
31. The Am. Cas. Ins. Co. Case, 82 Aid. 535, 578, 34 At!. 778, 786 (1896).
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tion as can be marshaled by all the persons involved in the preparation of a
new issue,3 2 on the assumption that many investors unnecessarily lose their
capital because they are persuaded to purchase securities about which they
have little accurate information. 33 Because the capability of the Securities and
Exchange Commission to discover the truth of statements made is limited, and
the accuracy of the information is an essential part of the statutory scheme,
the civil liability provisions in effect reinforce the reviewing power of the
Commission by requiring that all participants have reasonable grounds to
believe in the truth of the information provided.3 4 Furthermore, it is clear that
compensation to injured purchasers is not an essential purpose of the act, since
it is generally recognized that numerous and widely scattered small stock-
holders seldom find it worthwhile to bear the expense of the necessarily tor-
tuous litigation required to enforce their claims.35 Merely to ensure compensa-
tion to the few who can afford to demand it would not meet the problem; in
fact, the paucity of litigation under Section 11 has borne out this assumption3
The act has made the encouragement of investigation and disclosure primary
goals in order to prevent misstatements or omissions which would give rise to
liability.
Thus the cases upholding indemnity agreements, insofar as they assume that
the purposes of civil liability are accomplished if the injured party is coin-
pensated, are not applicable in determining the validity of such agreements un-
der the prophylactic policy of the Securities Act. The act contemplates that
most statements in a registration statement will be verified separately by sever-
al of the participants.37 But since the effect of indemnification is to shift all the
liability for any given statement to the indemnitor, the likelihood of multiple
32. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933).
33. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 7704-05 (1934); Note, Publicity and the Security Market
A Case Study, 7 U. Ci. L. REv. 676, 680-81 (1940).
34. [T]he provisions for civil liability are calculated to be largely preventive rather
than redressive .... But even this purpose of securing preventive vigilence . . . is
only coordinate with, or probably subordinate to, another object . . . [namelyJ] to
compel the disclosure of significant matters which were heretofore rarely, if ever,
disclosed. Civil liability is imposed largely as one appropriate means of accomplish-
ing these ends ....
Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
35. [R]egulation in this field is and will remain relatively unimportant from a com-
pensatory angle.... In this connection it should be remembered that man's habit of
sleeping on his legal rights is notorious.... The truth of this generalization Is ap-
parent from the extremely small number of claims actually prosecuted in some of our
recent and more notorious scandals.
Douglas & Bates, supra note 14, at 216. See Note, 71 YALE L.J. 1341, 1346 (1962).
36. Of some 18,000 registration statements cleared by the Commission, there have
been only eleven actions brought under § 11 and, of these, only two have resulted in ad-
judicated recovery. 3 Loss 1690-91.
37. Douglas & Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act upon Investment Banking, 1
U. CHI. L. REv. 283, 291 (1934). The General Counsel of the S.E.C. has referred to "the
duty of thorough investigation and analysis imposed by the Act on the underwriter proper."




verification is decreased. Loss therefore seems correct in suggesting that agree-
ments indemnifying those liable under Section 11 are "hostile to the in ter-
roren effect of the Act.' 3 8
In view of this conclusion, the Commission's suggestion in Rule 460 that
agreements indemnifying directors offend public policy, while those indemnify-
ing underwriters do not, seems unjustifiable. It may be that the basis for Rule
460 is the well established common law rule that agreements indemnifying
directors for negligent mismanagement are invalid. 9 Such agreements are
denied enforcement at common law because they work a "travesty of justice"40
by requiring, in effect, that stockholders, successful in a derivative suit, must
reimburse the unsuccessful director. Thus the stockholders, like the railroad
passenger in Lockwood, are deprived of their compensation. Since indemnifica-
tion for Section 11 liability does not deprive the injured purchaser of his com-
pensation,41 however, the rationale of the common law rule lends no support
to the Commission's treatment of directors' indemnity agreements as more
offensive than underwriters' agreements. Furthermore, the Commission's state-
ment that director's indemnity is against public policy "as expressed in the
Act" is inexplicable; as has been shown, all agreements indemnifying partici-
pants in the preparation of a registration statement equally defeat the in ter-
rorero effect of Section 11.
Loss suggests that the difference in the treatment of underwriters and direc-
tors in Rule 460 arises from "the fears expressed during the early days of
the Act that underwriters would be unwilling to assume the full risks of Sec-
tion 11 .... ,42 But in view of the legislative history, the Commission does not
38. 3 Loss 1831. English public policy supports this reasoning. In 1925, the Court of
Appeal upheld an agreement which indemnified an independent auditor held civilly liable for
failing to discharge his statutory duty to make a reasonable investigation of company books.
In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., Ltd., [1925] 1 Ch. 407 (C.A. 1924). Immediately sub-
sequent, a Parliamentary Committee concluded that such agreements allowed the indemnitee
"with impunity [to] be guilty of the grossest negligence," and that they defeated the pur-
poses of the general law which imposed duties in the conduct of corporate affairs. BoAnsn o,
TRADE, REPORT OF COMPANY LAw AMENDMENT CoM. rrF, 1925-26, at 19. Parliament
responded by prohibiting indemnity agreements favoring company directors or independent
auditors. Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 152, embodied in Companies Act,
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 205, 6 HALSBURY, LAvs OF ENGLAND § 621 (3d ed. 1954), and
later extended this policy to debenture trustees, Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38,
§ 88(1), 6 HALSBURY, supra. at § 906.
39. McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 F. 103, 114 (8th Cir. 1906); Apfel v. Auditore,
223 App. Div. 457, 228 N.Y. Supp. 489 (1928), aff'd nere., 250 N.Y. 600, 166 N.E. 339
(1929) ; Hollander v. Breeze Corps., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507 (1941), affd per curiam,
131 N.J. Eq. 613, 26 A.2d 522 (1942). See Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate
Directors in Stockholders' Suits, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 433 (1940); Bishop, Current
Status of Corporate Directors' Right to Indeninification, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1060 (1956).
40. McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill Co., 31 Mont. 563, 572, 79 Pac. 248 (1905).
41. The purchaser can sell his stock before recovery, § 11(e) (2), 48 Stat. 83 (1933),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2) (1958), thereby immunizing himself from the effect of any in-
demnification, but even if he chose to retain the security, the effect of indemnification on his
investment would generally be insignificant.
42. 3 Loss 1835.
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seem justified in acting on this theory; Congress specifically considered such
fears in 1934,43 and passed two amendments to Section 11. The first lowers the
standard of care of persons other than issuers from "that required of a person
occupying a fiduciary relationship '44 to "that required of a prudent man in the
management of his own property. '' a The second lessens the duty 40 of persons
other than the issuer to verify statements made on the authority of an expert;
those persons, other than the expert himself, must discharge a negative bur-
den-that they had no reasonable ground to disbelieve the statements 47-
rather than the positive burden applying to all other statements in the registra-
tion statement and prospectus. But there is no indication that Congress intended
further to relieve underwriters of their statutory duty. Moreover, Section 11
liability has not been as drastic as its critics predicted.48
The arguments which indicate that indemnity agreements are contrary to
the policy of the Securities Act would apply with equal force to insurance
contracts.49 Arguably, however, current practices of underwriting insurance
may not have the same effect on the prophylactic policy of Section 11 as in-
demnity agreements. Premiums for such policy are high; thus underwriters
frequently do not or cannot obtain coverage to the full extent of the issue,.0
Even more important, it is probable that insurance for subsequent issues
would be more expensive or more difficult to obtain after an underwriter was
found liable under Section 11. Indemnity clauses in underwriting agreements,
on the other hand, would seem to be readily available to the underwriter with-
out significant increase in the price he pays for the securities to be issued. This
will be especially true where a contract is negotiated between a large under-
writer and a small unsophisticated issuer, the situation in which the mainte-
nance of high standards of investigation by the underwriter is most in the pub-
lic interest.
43. Id. at 1727.
44. Section ll(c), 48 Stat. 83 (1933).
45. 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 77k(c) (1958).
46. See § 11 (b) (3) (C), 48 Stat.83 (1933).
47. 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 77k(b)3(C) (1958).
48. See 3 Loss 1634; note 36 supra.
49. The choice of policy goals--whether the essential purpose of the liability imposed is
to prevent the breach of duty or to compensate the injured party-also seems to be the con-
trolling factor here. Thus insurance against liability for murder, Burt v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1902), and rape, Haser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53
N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1952), has been held void as tending to "encourage an abatement of
the laws," id. at 512. But where a state statute required automobile liability insurance,
thereby enunciating a public policy that compensation to injured persons was the dominant
goal of liability, it was held that an insurance policy covering willful injury was not void,
though at common law it would not have been upheld, Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass.
549, 554, 9 N.E2d 544, 547 (1937). The cases upholding insurance for negligence liability,
supra note 24, rest on the assumption that compensation is the dominant goal; where public
policy is demonstrably that prevention of breach of duty is more important than compensa-
tion, the validity of insurance contracts may be questioned.
50. PRACTICING LAw INsTrITuT, op. cit. spra note 7, at 84.
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